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ABSTRACT 
Confidential Revenue and Profit Forecasts by Management and Financial 
Analysts; Some First Results 
Interest in corporate forecasts has increased significantly in the last 
decade. This interest has been stimulated by the change in policy of several 
rule-making bodies toward benign acceptance or even requirement of forecast 
disclosures. Research has focussed on the accuracy of published management 
forecasts of profit, often taking the accuracy of published analysts' forecasts-
or forecasts generated from forecasting models as a Standard of comparison. 
The design of this study differs from previous research in at least three 
respects: (a) it is based on confidential instead of published data, (b) it 
includes revenue and profit data, and (c) it investigates to what extent the 
forecasters were themselves surprised by the actual outcomes. Included in 
this study are 53 forecasts of a representative sample of companies listed 
on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange and 124 forecasts provided by the members of 
the Dutch Financial Analysts Federation. 
The results are first presented for the management and analysts' groups 
separately. Then the comparative accuracy of these groups is analyzed. The 
paper concludes with. a discussion of some implications of this study in the 
context of the accounting policy debate on disclosure of corporate forecasts. 
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1. Introduction 
Interest in corporate forecasts has increased significantly in the last decade. 
Researcher? and practitioners alike have been concerned with such forecasts, 
mainly in the context of a discussion of the merits of publishing such 
information, either on a voluntary or on a mandatory basis. Most of the 
research done in this field has focussed on the accuracy of published profit 
forecasts. " Our research also concentrates on the accuracy of corporate 
forecasts but departs from previous research in several respects. Before we 
sketch, our research design, it is perhaps useful to discuss the importance 
of corporate forecasts in general and their accuracy in particular from 
several yiewpoints: 
1. As already noted aboye, the issue of voluntary or mandatory disclosure of 
corporate forecasts has been the prime motivation for research in this area. 
This interest has been stimulated by developments in several countries. In 
the UK , the City Panel and the London Stock Exchange issued regulations 
in 1969 with respect to forecast information. The regulations contained in 
the City Code on Take^Overs and Mergers allowed profit forecasts to be 
included in documents containing take-over bids. The accounting bases and 
calculations for the forecasts must be examined and reported on by auditors. 
It is a Stock Exchange requirement tnat "a statement as to the financial 
and trading prospects" of a company should be included in the prospectus 
when a quotation for securities is sought (Dev & Webb, 1972). In the UK, 
it is permitted to include a profit forecast in the annual report, but so 
far this is nat a Standard practice, In most published reports verbal 
expressions of expectations are given. 
11 See Abdel- Khalik & Thompson (1978); Richards & Fraser (19781 and 
Westwick (1982). for a review of such research. 
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In the USA, it was not permitted to file profit forecasts with the SEC 
until 1973. Since 1973, inclusion of such forecasts in the documents to be 
filed is allowed. After several proposals had been aired in 1975 and 1976, 
a new series of requirements concerning the publication of profit forecasts 
was issued in 1978-1979. The SEC continued its policy of allowing voluntary 
profit forecasts. It encouraged auditing these forecasts by introducing. a 
"safe harbor rule" for auditors. This rule stipulates that the burden of 
proof of auditors' responsibility for providing shareholders with misleading 
information is on the plaintiffs, i.e. the shareholders. 
In the Netherlands, hardly any corporate forecasts are published, although 
many annual reports contain verbal descriptions of management's expectations. 
There is presently no rule forbidding or requiring such forecasts. In its 
proposals to implement the EC 4th Dirèctive, the Dutch government nas 
included a requirement to provide information in the annual report on the 
expected revenue and profitability for the forthcoming year. Such information 
need not necessarily be given as an expected revenue or profit figure, but 
of course this forthcoming legal requirement has stimulated discussions on 
the merits of alternative farms of presentation. 
2. Publication of corporate forecasts may only be useful if the published data 
have information content. This is often assumed on the basis of a priori 
reasoning (see e.g. FAF, 1973 or Nichols & Groomer, 1979). Recognizing that 
almost any shareholder decision model contains estimates of future cash 
flows, the information content of corporate forecasts is derived from their 
potential usefulness in estimating these variables, In order to possess 
such usefulness, the forecast information should be relevant for improving 
the decision-maker's estimates, which implies that it should be relatively 
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accurate. If so, societal benefits would also accrue from an improved 
allocation of resources. Some empirical research has aimed at testing the 
infonnation content of corporate profit forecasts in an efficiënt market 
setting (e.g. Foster, 1973 ; Pattell, 1976; Nichols & Tsay, 1979) . These 
studies have produced results consistent with the assumption of infonnation 
content in corporate profit forecasts. 
In addition to profit forecasts, sales revenue forecasts could also be 
studied. Although revenue forecasts have so far received less attention 
than profit forecasts, in some publications the usefulness of revenue 
forecasts is stressed, since sales revenue is a basic determinant for future 
profit. It is also suggested that revenue forecasts should be much more 
accurate than profit forecasts, since profit is only a small difference 
between two large numbers ('Revenues and Costs) . In this connection Ijiri 
(1975) developed the so-called "forecast error multiplier", which is the 
relationship between the profit forecast error and the revenue forecast 
error. In Ijiri*s analysis, the (lack of) accuracy of profit forecasts is 
to be explained by the inaccuracy of sales forecasts and the multiplying 
effect due to the level of fixed costs. 
Research into the opinions of financial statement users has indicated that 
they consider forecast infonnation to be useful and that such data rank 
high on the list of desired infonnation items (cf. Courtis, 1978; Lee & 
Tweedie, 1977 and 1981; Chang & Most, 1979; Klaassen & Schreuder, 1981). 
Such usefulness can, however, only be explained by an assumption on the 
part of the users that management can forecast the future levels of the 
relevant variables (revenues, profits, dividends etc.) at least as 
accurately as the users can themselves, This assumption may be based on 
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the belief that management possesses inside information which is potentially 
2) 
relevant for improving forecasting accuracy. 
4. Finally, from a performance evaluation point of view, forecast information 
could be considered to be potentially relevant as such forecasts could be 
used as yardsticks to evaluate performance a posteriori. For this purpose, 
too, the potential usefulness of forecasts is very much dependent on their 
accuracy (see Ijiri, 1975). 
Summing up: Forecast information may be useful from several viewpoints. This 
is, however, only the case if it meets standards of accuracy. These standards 
are to be derived from the present accuracy of decision-makers' estimates of 
the relevant corporate variables. The usefulness of forecast information is 
all the more important since in the UK and the USA the role of forecast 
information has increased considerably in the last decade, while regulating 
bodies in many other countries show an interest in the provision of such 
information as well. 
Our research has aimed at measuring the accuracy of corporate forecasts of 
sales revenue and profit as compared to analysts' forecasts and forecasts 
generated by naive models. The two latter types of forecasts were used as 
standards of comparison for the accuracy of management forecasts. Only the 
analysts' forecasts will be used here due to space limitations. In the next 
paragraphs we shall sketch our research design and present the results 
obtained. The paper concludes with. a summary of these results and a short 
discussion of their implications. 
2) According to Nichols & Groomer (1980, p. 1211 even inaccurate forecasts 
could contain important information, if these forecasts disclose important 
effects- of new developments, Again, such disclosures would be potentially 
relevant for improving the accuracy of users' forecasts. 
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2. Research design 
Research on corporate forecasts has mainly focussed on the accuracy of 
published profit forecasts. In early studies the accuracy of such forecasts 
has been established without comparative information (e.g. Daily, 1971; 
McDonald, 1973). Most of the recent research uses the accuracy of published 
analysts' forecasts and/or the accuracy of predictions based on forecasting 
models for benchmark purposes (e.g. Basi, Carey & Twark, 1976; Copeland & 
Marioni, 1972; Imhoff, 1978; Jaggi, 1978 and 1980; Nichols & Groomer, 1979; 
Ruland, 1978). 
As already noted in the introduction, no forecast disclosure practice exists 
in the Netherlands which is amenable to detailed quantitative analysis. If 
future-oriented information is provided by corporations, it is mostly couched 
in qualitative terms. In addition, few analysts' forecasts are made publicly 
available. Therefore, we could not base our research on published data and 
we had to devise a different project design from previous research. In the 
beginning of 1980, we have approached all companies listed on the Amsterdam 
Stock Exchange with a request to deposit their internal sales revenue and 
profit forecasts for 1980 in a sealed envelope at a notarial office. In 
addition, we have asked all 285 members of the Dutch Financial Analysts' 
Federatlon to deposit their forecasts of revenue and profit of the participating 
corporations at the same office. The notarial office guaranteed to all 
respondents that the forecasts would only be turned over to us after the 
actual figures on 198Q would have been published. We guaranteed that no 
individual data would be. derivable from our publications. 
Since our research, was conducted in the context of the discussion on the 
usefulness of thes-e data for users of financial statements, we requested the 
companies to deposit their forecasts before the annual report on the previous 
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financial year (1979) had been approved by the Board. In principle, therefore, 
these forecasts could have been included in the annual report. 
In order to test the uncertainties involved in preparing these forecasts both 
management and the analysts were requested to indicate two ranges around their 
"best guess" point estimates of 1980 revenue and profit: 
1. A 50 %-confidence interval denoting the area in which they expected the 
outcome to be with 50 % certainty; and 
2. A 100 %-confidence interval indicating the range of which they feit with 
complete certainty that it would contain the actual outcome. (Of course, 
they were asked to define this range within as narrow limits as possible). 
We obtained the co-operation of 55 out of the 193 companies listed on theAmster-
.dam Stock Exchange in 1979. Two companies, however, had to be excluded from 
our sample, as they went into bankruptcy before the end of 1980. Therefore, 
53 management forecasts were ultimately included in our sample. This sample 
proved to be representative for the total population of listed companies with 
respect to (a). dual tests of the variability of revenue and profit and (b) the 
absolute prediction errors resulting from the application of two revenue 
and profit forecasting models. " 
We received 124 analysts' forecasts from the notary. It is difficult to say 
how many different analysts participated in our study, as some analysts' 
departments of banks and institutional investors decided to participate as 
a group. Therefore, all we can say is that the analysts' forecasts were 
3)_ We shall not elaborate on these eight tests here, Suffice it to say that 
all test results were insignificant at the. 5 % level. Only one result for 
the absolute prediction errors of revenue was significant between the 
5 % and 10 % leveIs. 
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prepared by at least 30 analysts working for 14 different organisations, such 
as banks, pension funds, insurance companies and brokers. The majority of our 
participants - preparing 82 forecasts - work for 6 major Dutch banks. It is 
their task to advise on investment decisions of private investors. As such, 
they can be considered to be the most important and best-informed alternative 
source of information for private investors apart from the company itself. 
Most of the other analysts work for major institutional investors. They are 
responsible for the investment decisions of their institutions. 
Thus, our research, design differs from previous studies in at least the 
following respects: 
1. We did not use published forecasts, but asked management and analysts to 
make internal forecasts confidentially known to us (or to produce such a 
forecast for this special occasion). . 
This may have some impact on the accuracy of the forecasts, since research 
of Ferris (19751 has indicated that management forecasts might be adapted 
if forecasts are to be published (in order to have impact on the behavior 
of users), or even that outcomes might be to some extent manipulated if 
forecasts have been previously published. 
Our forecasts would not have such effects, and therefore might be expected 
to be the best, and most unbiased forecasts that management and analysts 
could produce. 
Another difference might be that companies who would not voluntarily 
publish forecasts, as they regard these as too unreliable. perhaps would 
participate in our research since they would perceive no unfavourable 
effects of such. participation. 
2. Our research, covered both. revenue and profit forecasts of the same 
companies. This enables- us to compare the accuracy of both forecasts. 
- 8 -
3. We asked our forecasters to express their own uncertainties by indicating 
their 50 %-and'100 %-confidence interval. 
4. As our respondents participated voluntarily in this study, we could ask 
them certain additional questions in order to get some background 
information which might be relevant for the explanation of results. 
5. For practical, reasons we could only include one year of forecasts in our 
research. 
3. Some results 
The measures used to determine the accuracy of the management and analysts' 
forecasts are: 
the prediction error (PE) = x - x 
the absolute prediction error (APE)_ = |x *- x[ 
the relative prediction error (RPE]L = x - x 
x 
the absolute relative prediction error (ARPE) = x - x 
where: x represents the forecast of revenue or profit for 1980 
x represents the actual reported revenue a profit for 1980. 
3.1 Management forecasts 
Table 3.1 shows the. RPE's determined for the management forecasts of sales 
revenue. The table demonstrates that these forecasts are mainly rather 
accurate: 55 % within the range of +_ 5 % and 79 % within the range of +_ 10 %. 
There seems to be no clear systematic bias in these forecasts: 25 show a 
negative RPE and 28 a positive RPE. The average RPE turned out to be - 0.8 % 
(er = 10.51 and the average ARPE 7.2 % (er = 7.61. 
4) Preliminary tests, based on the results of our forecasting models, indicate 
that 1980 was a representative year for revenue forecasting purposes. For 
profit forecasts 1980 might have been representative with respect to. the 
'direction of profit changes, but possibly not with respect to the volatility^ 
of profits. - — • 
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Table 3.1 Distribution of relative prediction errors of management forecasts 
of revenue 
KPE n % of total cumulative % 
(30 %) - (20 %) 3 6 6 
(20 %). - (15 %) 4 7 13 
(15 %) - (10 %) - - 13 
(10 %J - ( 5 %1 6 11 24 
( 5 %} - 0 % 12 23 47 
0 % - 5 % 17 32 79 
5 % - IQ % 7 13 92 
10 % - 15 % 2 4 96 
15 % - 20 % - - 96 
20 % _ 40 % 2 4 100 
53 100 
A total of 52 companies indicated their 50 %-confidence intervals and 44 their 
100 %-confidence intervals. In 22 out of the 52 cases (42.3 %) the outcomes 
were within the 50 %-range, including one entirely accurate prediction. In 
28 of the 44 cases (63,6 %]_ the actual outcome was within the 100 %-range. Of 
the 8 companies who defined a 50 %-range, but not a 100 %-range, 4 produced 
actual sales revenues within their 50 %-range, and thus also within their 
1Q0 %-range. The following illustration summarizes these data and shows that 
at least 16 of the 52 outcomes (30.8 %1 came as a complete surprise to our 
participants. 
Figure 3,2 The actual sales revenues in relation to the confidence intervals 
of management    
" 4 ' 9 1 12 " ' ' 6 8 
-H h- f — 1 : 1  
-100% -50% -* 50 % 100% 
x 
-> 
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Table 3.3 shows the distribution of the RPE!s associated with. management's 
profit forecasts. It ±s clear that these RPE's are more widely distributed 
than for the revenue forecasts. Some very large pred±ction errors result from 
low actual profit levels (close to zero).. The average RPE is -68.9 % (a = 507.3) 
and the average ARPE 16Q..6" % (er = 485.7), Even af ter elimination of the six 
outliers identified in table 3,3 the average ARPE was 50,4 %. Only 9 % of the 
companies have a RPE between +_ 5 % and only 27 % a RPE between +_ 10 %. Nearly 
twothirds (64,2 %1 of the prediction errors (x-x). were negative, indicating 
an optimistic bias of management in forecasting profits. 
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Table 3.3 Distribution of relative prediction errors of management 
forecasts of profit 
KPE n % of total""" cumulative % 
< (200 % ) . b i 
(200 %) - (150 %) 
(150 %) - (100 %) 
(100 %). - (50 %] 
(50 %} - (40 %) 
(40 %) - (30 %1 
(30 %) - (20 %). 
(20 %) - (15 %). 
(15 %) - (10 %) 
(10 %) - ( 5 %1 
( 5 %) - 0 % 
0 % - 5 % 
5 % - 10 % 
10 % - 15 % 
15 % - 2Q % 
20 % - 30 % 
3Q % - 4Q % 
4Q % - 50 % 
50 % - 100 % 
100 % - 150 % 
15Q.% - 200 % 
> 200 % C ) 
a) 
otal 
4 8 
0 0 
3 6 
4 8 
1 2 
4 8 
2 4 
2 4 
1 2 
5 9 
0 0 
5 9 
5 9 
0 0 
1 2 
2 4 
3 6 
Q 0 
1 2 
4 8 
4 8 
2 ... 4 
53 1QQ 
13 
21 
23 
30 
34 
38 
40 
49 
49 
58 
68 
68 
70 
74 
79 
79 
81 
89 
96 
100 
a)L Due to rounding errors- these percentages do not add up to exactly 100 %. 
bl These negative outliers were: -231 %, ^460 %, -.970 % and -3395 %. 
cl These positive outliers were: 370 % and 715 %. 
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For most managers the actual profits Maat have been a complete surprise. 
In 28 cases the companies did not at all expect the profit figure they 
eventually realised, For 21 of these companies the results were much lower 
than they expected and for 7 companies the results were much higher. Figure 
3,4 summarizes^ the available information. 
Figure 3.4 The actual profits in relation to the confidence intervals of 
' management ' _ ^ _ 
21 6 3 10 1 7 
f 1 1 [ 1  
TOLQQ % r-50. % x 5Q % 100 % 
A comparisc-n of revenue and profit forecasts shows that revenue forecasts 
on average were unbiased whereas' profit forecasts were too optimistic. 
The prediction errors of management's revenue forecasts were much smaller 
than the forecast errors of profits. We have expressed the relation between 
these forecast errors as the ratio of the revenue and profit ARPE's, which 
we call the "M-value". Excluding outliers the M-value is 
_ average ARPE of profit 50.4 _ 
average ARPE of revenue 7,2 
(including outliers M = — — y = 22,31 
We have also analyzed the outcomes by type of industry, company size and time 
of deposit, Due to space limitations the results of these analyses are not 
included here, 
5)_ This "M-value" is not identical to Ijiri's (19751 "forecast error multiplier". 
In Ijiri's analyses the prediction errors associated with the revenue and 
profit forecasts should have the same sign. This was only the case for 33 
of our 53 observations. 
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3.2 Analysts' forecasts 
Of the analys-ts inyited to participate, more than 30 analysts accepted the 
invitation. Since some large departments of banks- co^-operated, which sent 
all their forecasts- under one name, we do not know the exact number of 
participating analysts-. The analysts produced 119 revenue forecasts and 
124 profit forecasts mostly - but not only •<- of the participating companies. 
Table 3,5 shows the distribution of the RPE's of the analysts'sales revenue 
forecasts. 
Table 3.5 Distribution of relatiye prediction errors of analysts' forecasts 
of revenue. ._   
RPE n % Of total cumulative % 
(40 %1 - (30 %1 
(30 %L - (20 .%i 
(20 %I - (15 %1 
(15 %1 - (10 %1 
(10 %1 - ( 5 %)_ 
( 5 %1 - Q % 
Q % - 5 % 
5 %. - 10 % 
IQ % - 15 % 
15 % - 20 % 
20 % - 30 % 
3Q % - 40 %. 
4Q % T» 50 % 
5Q % — 60. % 
1 1 1 
- - 1 
2 2 3 
5 4 7 
7 6 13 
17 14 27 
33 28 55 
32 27 82 
12 IQ 92 
4 3 95 
5 4 99 
^ T- 99 
r> *> 99 
1 1 10Q 
119 1QQ % 
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The average RPE is 4.2 % (a = 10.0) while the average ARPË is 7.9 (a = 7.4), 
Nearly 40 % of the realised sales revenues were outside the predicted 100 % 
certainty-interval, which means that this 40 % of the outcomes was not at 
all expected by the analysts. By far most of these outcomes were higher 
than expected. 
Table 3.6 Distribution of relative prediction errors of analysts' forecasts 
of profit 
RPE 
%) 
n 
4b) 
% of totala) 
3 
cumulative % 
< (200 3 
(200 %) - (150 %) 4 3 6 
(150 %) - (100 %) 3 2 9 
(100 %) - ( 50 %) 9 7 16 
( 50 %) - ( 40 %) 6 5 21 
( 40 %) - ( 30 %) 8 6 27 
( 30 %) - ( 20 %) 4 3 31 
( 20 %) - ( 15 %) - - 31 
( 15 %) - ( 10 %) 2 2 32 
( 10 %) - ( 5 %) 9 7 40 
( 5 %) - 0 % 9 7 47 
0 % - 5 % 15 12 59 
5 % - 10 % 6 5 64 
10 % - 15 % 9 7 71 
15 % - 20 % 1 1 72 
20 % - 30 % 8 6 78 
30 % - 40 % 6 5 83 
40 % - 50 % - - 83 
50 % - 100 % 6 5 88 
100 % - 150 % 9 7 95 
150 % - 200 % 2 2 97 
> 200 % 4C) 3 100 
124 100 % 
a) Due to rounding errors these percentages do not add up to exactly 100 
b) These negative outliers were: -271 %, -876 •%, -1766 % and -7721 %. 
c) These positive outliers were: 282 %, 327 %, 356 % and 869 %. 
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Most of the predictions (73.1 %) showed a positive prediction error, 
indicating that the analysts were-too pessimistic about the sales revenues. 
All 124 analysts' forecasts contained a profit forecast. Contrary to the 
revenue forecasts, the profit forecasts were mainly too optimistic, as 
57.3 % of the prediction errors were negative. Table 3.6 shows the 
distribution of the analysts' profit forecast errors, as measured by the 
RPE. The RPE's of profit forecasts are clearly more widely distributed than 
those of sales revenue forecasts. The average RPE is -71.8 % with a very 
high Standard deviation of 723.8. The average ARPE is 138.5 % with a Standard 
deviation of 713.9. If we delete the 8 outliers, identified in table 3.6, 
the ARPE is 40.6 (a = 45.5). 
The analysts were also in many cases surprised by the magnitude of the 
realised profit figures. In 70 out of 117 cases (59.8 %) the realised profit 
was outside the 100 %-confidence interval as defined by analysts, which 
implies that they did not at all expect the realised outcome when making 
their forecast. 
For analysts, too, the conclusion holds that the predictability of sales 
revenues is much better than the predictability of profits. If we delete 
the 8 outliers, identified in table 3.6, we can compute a M-value of 
* = 5.1. If we include the outliers the M.value is 18.0. 
We analysed the results by type of industry, type of analyst, time of deposit, 
company size, and also on the basis of the available information. Only some 
of the latter results will be reported here. From previous research (e.g. 
Ruland, 1978; Jaggi, 1978 and 1980) it is clear that the information available 
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to analysts may have an impact on the accuracy of their forecasts. 
All analysts were asked to file their forecasts with the notary before the 
date of publication of the 1979 annual report of the company to be forecasted. 
This was done to ensure that the timing of the management and analysts' 
forecasts was about the same. This procedure could, however, introducé a 
handicap for the analysts if they would have no knowledge of the financial 
outcomes of the previous year. Therefore, the analysts were asked to indicate 
in addition to their forecast, whether or not, at the time of making their 
forecast for 1980, they had reliable information concerning the revenue and 
profit for 1979. We obtained 84 positive replies and 40 negative replies. 
The available information had no marked effect on the accuracy of the sales 
revenue forecasts, but was very important for the accuracy of profit fore-
casts, as is shown by the following data: 
n RPE ARPE 
reliable information on 1979 84 -3.7 35.7 
no reliable information on 1979 40 -214.7 354.3 
So it looks as if information concerning the previous financial year is much 
more important for the prediction of profits than for sales forecasting. 
3.3 A comparison of management and analysts' forecasts 
The results reported above were based on management forecasts for 53 companies 
and on 124 analysts'forecasts for these, but also for some other, companies. 
For comparative purposes we have reduced our sample to those companies for 
which there is a management forecast and at least one analyst forecast 
available. If more than one analysts' forecast was available, the average was 
computed. 
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Our sample now contains 34 companies for revenue forecasts and 38 companies 
for profit forecasts. Included are 98 revenue forecasts and 113 profit fore-
casts of analysts. The number of analysts' forecasts per company ranges 
from 1 to 7. Our research question was: are management forecasts more 
accurate than analysts' forecasts? 
Concerning this question table 3.7 gives some insights. 
Table 3.7 Some characteristics of management and analysts' revenue and 
profit forecasts 
Revenue Profit 
Measure Management Analysts Management Analysts 
PE 25.5 94.0 -13.5 -12.2 
O 
PE 
197.3 203.3 52.4 50.6 
APE 81.4 109.3 16.8 17.9 
a 
APE 
181.0 195.2 51.4 48.8 
RPE 0.8 1.8 -27.0 -48.6 
0 
RPE 
10.5 10.2 223.0 346.4 
ARPE 6.7 7.7 102.9 139.4 
a 
ARPE 
8.0 6.8 199.0 320.1 
Other as ipects 
% of overestimates 41.2 38.2 65.8 57.9 
% of underestimates i 58.8 61.8 34.2 4.2.1 
% in 50 %-range 44.1 44.1 29.7 26.3 
% in IOC i %-range 65.5 64.7 40.6 36.8 
Analyzing the comparative revenue data first, we observe that all prediction 
errors are smaller for management than for the analysts, although the 
differences are not very impressive for the two absolute measures. In all 
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cases the Standard deviations are quite large, indicating a wide dispersion 
of the observations. The other characteristics are very similar: both 
management and the analysts were too pessimistic about the sales revenues and to 
very much the same extent. Both also defined fax too narrow 100 %-certainty 
intervals. 
Turning our attention to the comparative profit data, we observe very small 
differences between the PE's and APE's of management and the analysts. The 
relative prediction errors show somewhat larger differences, but these 
measures are very heavily influenced by outliers, when applied to our profit 
data. Eliminating 4 of these for both sets of data the RPE for management 
becomes -2.4 % and for analysts -3.6 %, while the ARPE's are 45.1 % and 
51.1 % respectively. Management was a bit more optimistic than the analysts 
in the case of the profit forecasts. Both groups very much underestimated 
the uncertainty associated with their profit forecasts and were totally 
surprised by the actual outcomes in about 60 % of the cases. 
In order to test for significance of these differences we have applied two 
tests to the data in table 3.8, namely the "sign test" and the "Wilcoxon 
matched-pairs signed-ranks test". Table 3,8 reveals that management 
outperformed the analysts in 19 out of 34 cases when the absolute prediction 
error is taken as the measure of the accuracy of their revenue forecasts. In 
two cases it was a draw, while the analysts outperformed management in 
13 cases. This difference is not significant at the normal significance 
7) levels of 5 % or 10 %. For the profit forecasts the differences are even 
61 See Brown & Rozeff (1978) for a critique of some other tests used in 
previous research and for an exposition of the applicability of the 
latter test. 
7) The sign test reveals a significance level of 14 %, the Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-ranks test a level of 15 %. 
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Table 3.8 Comparison of performance of management vis-a-vis the analysts 
Revenue Profit 
19 20 
2 
13 18 
34 38 
1.061 0.324 
1.028 0.776 
smaller. Management outperforms the analyst in only 20 out of 38 cases. 
Needless to say that this difference is far from significant. It may be 
added that these comparisons have been made on the basis of all available 
analysts' forecasts, whether the analyst had indicated that he had reliable 
information on 1979 or not. As we have seen in the preceding paragraph the 
availability of such information has a marked effect on the accuracy of 
analysts' profit forecasts. If the uninformed analysts are eliminated, 
however, management still shows a slightly gr'eater accuracy than analysts 
and the differences are still not significant. 
3.4 Pur results compared with previous research 
Our results can only to some extent be compared with previous research, as 
most studies have focussed exclusively on profit forecasts. In this paragraph 
we shall review some studies which have compared the accuracy of management's 
and analysts' profit forecasts in order to see whether our results fall in 
line with those previously obtained. 
Basi, Carey and Twark (19761 studied the relative accuracy of 88 management 
earnings forecasts published in the Wall Street Journal in 1970 and 1971 with 
APE < APE 
man anal 
APE = APE 
man anal 
APE > APE 
man anal 
sign test 
Wilcoxon test 
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analysts' forecasts published in Standard and Poor's Earnings Forecaster 
(before management's publication). The average AKPE of management was 10.1 % 
with analysts' ARPE being 13.8 %. The differences are not statistically 
significant at the 5 % level. Both groups of forecasts were on average too 
optimistic. 
Imhoff (1978) replicated the study of Basi, Carey and Twark with data from 
1971-1974. His findings confirm their conclusions that there is no statisti-
cally significant difference between the accuracy of both types of forecasts.-
Ruland (1978) also tested the relative accuracy of management and analysts' 
forecasts. He distinguished between analysts' forecasts published prior to 
management's forecasts and analysts' forecasts published after the 
publication date of management's forecasts. The latter group was more 
accurate, as could be expected a priori. Although the management forecasts 
were more often accurate than both groups of analysts' forecasts, the 
differences were again not statistically significant. 
Finally, Jaggi (1978 and 1980) also conducted a similar research study. He 
used analysts' forecasts from the Value Line Investment Service, published 
in the first quarter of the years 1971-1974. Hls findings show that 
management forecasts were on average significantly more accurate than 
analysts' forecasts. A more detailed analysis, however, reveals that this 
is only true for the analysts' forecasts published before the management 
forecasts. These analysts are, therefore, confronted with a longer fore-
casting horizon and possibly also with a knowledge handicap, if they are 
yet unaware of the previous year's outcomes. The differences were not 
8) This difference is important when one uses published forecasts, as 
the analysts' forecasts issued after the management's forecast cannot 
be assumed independent of the latter, 
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significant when analysts' forecasts were published just after the-
publication of management forecasts, but of course these may not be 
__assumed__independent. — 
All of these studies used published management and analysts' forecasts which 
implies that there is the timing problem indicated above. Comparing the 
results of these studies for analysts' forecasts published before the 
management forecasts, it turns out that management shows a greater accuracy 
in all studies, but that the difference is only significant in one of the 
four studies. In the two studies which also investigated the analysts' fore-
casts issued after management's forecast no significant differences were 
found. In our study, we have no such timing problem, as we work with 
confidential data. Keeping this difference in mind, we may conclude that 
our findings with respect to profit forecasts conform with the general trend 
in previous research. In this study, too, management forecasts outperform 
analysts' forecasts in only slightly more than half of the cases. This 
difference is not at all significant. 
4. Conclusions and implications 
The conclusions to be drawn from this study may be summarized as follows: 
Management forecasts 
1. The management forecasts of revenue show no systematic bias. Nearly 80 % 
of these forecasts were within a range of 10 % around the actual outcome. 
Nevertheless, nearly onethird of the outcomes fall outside management's 
100 %-confidence interval and thus came as a complete surprise. 
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2. The management forecasts of profit show rather high prediction errors 
in our study. Only 27 % was in the +_ 10 % range around the outcome. Nearly 
twothirds of the companies were too optimistic about their profits and 
more than half of the companies were completely surprised by the actual 
profit figure. 
3. Revenue forecasts are much more accurate than profit forecasts. Excluding 
outliers the ratio is about 1 : 7 . 
4. In 20 of our 53 cases the prediction errors computed for the revenue and 
profit forecasts did not show the same sign. Therefore, an explanation 
of the profit forecast errors in terms of Ijiri's (1975) "forecast error 
multiplier" is not meaningful for nearly 40 % of our observations. 
Analysts forecasts 
5. The analysts' forecasts of revenue exhibited a pessimistic bias. About 
75 % of these forecasts were within a range of 10 % around the actual 
outcome. In 40 % of the cases the actual revenue was realized outside the 
100 %-confidence interval of the analyst. 
6. The analysts' forecasts of profit were mainly (57.3 %) too optimistic. 
Only 31 % was in the range +_ 10 % around the outcome. In nearly 60 % of 
the cases the actual profit figure feil outside the 100 %-confidence 
interval of the analyst. 
1. Excluding outliers, the ratio between the absolute relative prediction 
errors of revenue and profit is about 1 : 5 for analysts. 
8. Excluding analysts without reliable information on the previous year's 
financial results of the company has no marked effect on the accuracy 
of the revenue forecasts, but a large influence on the accuracy of the 
profit forecasts. 
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Management versus analysts 
9. Management's forecasts of revenue were more accurate than analysts' 
forecasts, as measured by the f our types of prediction errors. However, 
the number of times management outperformed the analysts in our 
comparable cases (19 out of 34 cases) was not statistically significant 
at the 10 % level. 
10. The other characteristics of the revenue forecasts are very much the 
same too. Both groups were, for instance, completely surprised by the 
actual revenue for about 35 % of the companies. 
11. Management's profit forecasts were more accurate than the average 
analysts' forecasts for only 20 of the 38 companies in our comparison 
sample. This difference is^of course, far from significant. This result 
accords well with findings in previous comparative research. 
12. Management was slightly more often optimistic about the 1980 profits, 
and was slightly less often surprised by the actual outcome. Nevertheless, 
still nearly 60 % of the realized profits came as a complete surprise. 
Implications 
Which implications can be drawn from this study? As stated in the introduction, 
most of this type of research is conducted in the context of the forecast 
disclosure issue. Limiting our attention to this issue, how do our results 
bear upon the discussion about voluntary or mandatory forecast disclosure? 
It should be stated from the outset that we regard this issue as a matter 
of accounting policy, which cannot ultimately be solved by empirical research. 
All kinds of costs, benefits and preferences play their part in this policy 
issue, which cannot be totally captured (or reconciled) within a research 
framework. 
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Nevertheless, it has been shown in the introduction that a crucial 
assumption for forecast information to be useful is that it meets standards 
of accuracy. These standards are to be derived from the present accuracy of 
decision-makers' estimates of the relevant corporate variables. Analysts 
can be regarded as one of the main alternative sources of information for 
decision-makers when making such estimates. If the information to be obtained 
from management cannot be shown to be more accurate than the information from 
alternative sources, its usefulness becomes highly questionable. 
This study adds to the evidence concerning the relative accuracy of 
management and analysts' forecasts. It differs from previous studies in 
several respects. Some of the main differences are that (a) it includes 
revenue and profit data, (b) it is based on confidential instead of 
published data, and (c) it investigates to what extent both groups are 
themselves surprised by the actual outcomes. In this study management did 
not show a significantly better ability to forecast either revenue or profit. 
In nearly onethird of the cases management was itself completely surprised 
by the actual revenues and in more than half of the cases by the actual 
profits. Our results can be compared with some research on the relative 
accuracy of management's voluntarily published profit forecasts vis-a-vis 
published analysts' forecasts. They turn out to be well in line with the 
findings of this type of research. Generally, management forecasts profits 
slightly, not significantly, more accurate than analysts. 
Of course, our findings are subject to many limitations. They only pertain 
to the 1980 forecasts of a representative sample of Dutch' corporations 
listed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. If, however, the evidence which is 
gradually being gathered continues to point in the direction described 
above, the benefits of forecast disclosure might be significantly smaller 
than believed on a priori grounds. Such a finding would certainly have an 
important impact on the accounting policy debate concerning such forecasts. 
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